2021年4月11日

Anusha Nandakumar和Sandeep Saket在《這場戰爭成就了R&AW》一書中寫道，隨著1971年孟加拉國解放戰爭，間諜頭子R.N. Kao將印度的RAW置於世界情報地圖上。高錕和布裏格製定了戰略。這支部隊被置於勞改部隊的直接指揮之下，執行的任務與高錕現在讓班執行的任務一模一樣。“城市，破壞和騷擾他們。進入他們的大腦。盡你所能摧毀一切。把吉大港山區帶回來。“烏班在吉大港山發起了鷹行動。這是一項極其秘密的任務，隻有R&AW和SFF知道。這次行動沒有任何官方記錄。在1971年的整個戰爭中，烏班的西藏軍隊一直進行著破壞性的破壞和騷擾活動。 They succeeded in destroying several vital bridges and ensuring that Pakistan’s 97 Independent Brigade and crack 2 Commando Battalion remained pressured in the Hill Tracts. The SFF functioned at an optimal rate with only 56 dead and 190 wounded. While R&AW and the Indian Army strategised their moves in India, Yahya Khan seemed to be whiling away his time in Karachi. It was reported that Khan was making the legendary Pakistani singer Noor Jehan sing for him on long-distance phone calls from Japan. As she crooned beautiful songs to the president, Yahya Khan would interrupt to shower praises on her. A war had broken out, but Yahya Khan had chosen to cocoon himself in the company of women and wine rather than lead his men in the war that he had begun. To his surprise, Kao observed that the Pakistan Army was every bit as self-assured as Yahya Khan. When the pre-emptive strikes were launched, the chief of PAF told the military’s public relations (PR) officer not to bother conjuring up a justification. ‘Success is the biggest justification,’ the PAF chief had boasted. ‘My bird should be right over Agra by now, knocking the hell out of them. I am only waiting for the good news.’ ‘Hardly surprising,’ Nair observed. ‘Their vulnerability is coupled with curious overconfidence about their superiority vis-à-vis India. The idea of the innate superiority of the Muslim soldier was bequeathed to Pakistan by the British Raj’s theory of martial races. You know, the idea that one Muslim warrior is worth ten Hindus. It has since then been internalised by its military classes.’ But Pakistan’s war strategies were all backfiring, and with good reason. Earlier in the year, Pakistan had purged the Bengali units from the army. Many Bengalis, especially those who belonged to the West Pakistan units, had defected, and those who remained were not trustworthy. Consequently, the combat effectiveness of the units suffered, especially that of the PAF, as a majority of the ground crew had been Bengali. The Pakistani military services were also weakened by the fact that they had been politicised. The structure of the army was overly centralised, as Yahya Khan had wanted to retain his control over its operations in addition to his duties as president and supreme commander of Pakistan’s armed forces. Communications and cooperation between the three forces of the Pakistani Army—located in Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Karachi—suffered as a result. There was no doubt that the Pakistani Army had lost its original vigour. And, India was capitalising on their dwindling alertness and strength. Three days after the war began, on 6 December 1971, Indira Gandhi publicly recognised Bangladesh as an independent state. The declaration had been a long time coming. But it had been imperative for India to keep her position a secret until the war had begun. Gandhi was prudent enough to first secure empathy from the UN and world media for choosing to participate in the war before revealing where India’s sympathies lay. This excerpt from ‘The War That Made R&AW’ by Anusha Nandakumar and Sandeep Saket has been published with permission from Westland Publications and Golden Pen-Writers First. Subscribe to our channels on YouTube & Telegram Why news media is in crisis & How you can fix it India needs free, fair, non-hyphenated and questioning journalism even more as it faces multiple crises. But the news media is in a crisis of its own. There have been brutal layoffs and pay-cuts. The best of journalism is shrinking, yielding to crude prime-time spectacle. ThePrint has the finest young reporters, columnists and editors working for it. Sustaining journalism of this quality needs smart and thinking people like you to pay for it. Whether you live in India or overseas, you can do it here .